Saturday, June 13, 2020

Experience, Communication Contributed to Airblue Tragedy - 1375 Words

Teamwork, Leadership, Experience, and Communication Contributed to the Airblue Tragedy (Essay Sample) Content: Airblue 202NameDateOn 28th of July 2010, Airblue 202 an Airbus with 146 passengers on board and six crew members crashed into the Margalla Hills near Islamabad. The plane had left Jinnah International Airport, Karachi; Pakistan headed for Benazir Bhutto International Airport Islamabad. The worst accident on Pakistan soil was the cause of the demise of all the 146 passengers and the six crew members. The Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority has released a report detailing on the crash and possible causes. I picked some of the most impactful reasons for the crash. We will study how communication, leadership, teamwork, experience and company policies played out in the crash analysis. The Captain, First Officer, and the crew increased the chances of crashing through their lack of communication, teamwork, good experience and compliance with company policies.CommunicationAccording to the CAA (2010) report, the captain failed to obey the several warnings sent to him by the traf fic control. Communication between the crew and the traffic control was hindered by the angry pilot. When the plane was about 3.5nm from the destination airport, the plane was going for the NAV, yet it was in HDG mode. The traffic control asked the crew if they were visual but the pilot refused to cooperate. Finally, the pilot was instructed to turn left due to the terrain ahead; he was frustrated and angry therefore failed to act as quickly as it was required.The CAA (2010) report concluded that the accident was as a result of poor communication and unresponsive captain. Some of the communication problems can be noted consistently by the captain. When the plane broke off from the ILS approach, the captain was warned of a poor weather and instructed to fly a bad weather circuit. He refused and said, Let him say whatever he wants to say.  When the plane was heading to the forest, the FO had warned the pilot is telling him there was terrain ahead. The captain perhaps due to anger r efused to comply. At some point as they were approaching the forest, traffic control had asked if they were visual but the captain refused to answer, the FO asked him too, and he still refused to answer to that. By now communication was very poor between traffic control officer and the pilot and his crew. The captain was not having a smooth communication with traffic control either while the crew was not in communication with the pilot (Khan, 2012).LeadershipThere was poor leadership displayed by the way the plane was managed. When the plane took off, the black box reveals that the pilot was angry with the FO. He was also not in proper terms with the whole crew team as later revealed by the conversations. The pilot even told the FO not to worry about the traffic control and just to let him say whatever he wants to say. Few miles from the Islamabad airport the traffic controller had asked the crew and the pilot severally if they were visual of the ground. The pilot never said anythin g for a long term. There was a warning of a terrain ahead but the pilot did not obey the command to turn left on an autopilot. He did not turn the airplane; only the HDG bug was turned to the left. The plane crew leadership especially of the pilot was very poor. He gave both the crew and traffic controller hell of a time to land the plane.The pilot refused to hear out the FO as he warned severally of an approaching terrain. Even when the plane was supposed to change direction to the left, the pilot refused to hear the FO out and adjust the direction of the plane. He also exhibited very poor leadership skills of shutting other people down and refusing to respond to the junior requests. When the pilot kept the plane on the NAV yet the pilot was on HDG mode the FO reminded him saying: Ok sir, but are you visual?  (CAA, 2010). The captain did not find it possible to confirm. The FO had warned severally; the pilot said: "yes we are turning left" (Khan, 2012). He did not turn the p lane as he was supposed to do.TeamworkThere was very poor teamwork with the Airblue 2002. As the plane leaves the airport immediately, the pilot becomes hostile. He refuses to cooperate with the crew, and the traffic controller, Instead he tries to run the plane alone. He first refused to make the weather circuit, secondly, continues to fly without a visual of the ground. The pilot too fails to promote teamwork when he does not cooperate with the controller telling the FO to live him alone. He is not working with the FO and the Traffic Controller. The CAA (2010), argue that he was trying to be on his own.ExperienceThe plane crew members showed a lot of lack of experience as they flew the plane. First, the pilot refused to take in very important traffic controller remarks. He flew continuously straight without giving the controller a chance to direct him to safety. The second poor experience shown by the pilot is that he wanted to descend to about 2000 ft. only to be reminded by the FO that he could not go below 2,500ft. The captain kept flying on NAV, yet the plane was on HDG mode (Dawn, 2012).The captain failed to know where geographically they were and did not bother to ask, something very inexperienced about that captain. In an attempt to turn left after receiving a warning from the Traffic control, the captain set the heading bug on but forgot to pull the HDG knob. Since the aircraft was in NAV mode, the plane could not take commands. This shows a complete lack of experience and good training. 30 seconds before the impact, we note that the captain engaged in a series of desperate moves that were very wrong. For instance, thrust levers were moved to the MCT/ FLX detent instead of TOGA position disengaging the auto thrust of the plane. In his panic, however, according to the CAA report, the pilot kept on moving the HDG bug without knowing and limiting the plane from performing the command. He even asked the FO, why are we not turning left? (CAA, 2010). The F irst Officer (FO) on the other end showed the lack of experience when he noticed that the captain was making wrong decisions and failed to take over. The FO kept telling the captain that there was terrain ahead and even eventually told him we are going down.  The FO was expected to detect the anxiety and the emotiona...